The middle classes
have traditionally been labelled as the biggest losers in the German Hyperinflation
of 1923. Jones argues those with savings and fixed incomes which
became worthless, came out the worst.
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This is a
rather simplistic argument which Hubbard challenges. The German middle classes of
1923 were too diverse a group to easily classify as they often were both creditors
and debtors. The perceived destruction of the middle classes relates primarily
to civil servants, who were the most studied social group, with data showing
that senior civil servants real wages were 82% of pre-war levels in 1924.
Some supposed
winners of the inflation certainly didn’t feel that way at the time. Farmers repaid
mortgages cheaply but were frustrated as they couldn’t afford to purchase more
land or machinery. Urban landlords likewise repaid debts easily but saw the
rental value of their properties evaporate and were put under pressure by government-imposed
rent caps.
The greatest benefactors
of hyperinflation were industrialists. They held real assets, were able to cut production
if needed and were able to reinstate the 12- hour working day, due to the conditions
of workers who were desperate for an increase in nominal pay.
Conversely, the
working classes felt the most severe impact of the inflation. Data suggesting
an increase in real wages was flawed due to the short lived 8 hour working day,
while excluding non-unionised workers and those not working full time hours. They
also were the group most likely to experience hunger and unemployment because
of the inflation.
To conclude,
the middle classes as a whole saw declines in their status due to the
inflation, and perhaps are viewed as the greatest victim due to them having a more prominent role in society than the working classes, who ultimately suffered the most hardship.
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